Archive for the 'Government' Category

Aug 19 2015

Interview, Paul Kurtz, CEO of TruSTAR

Published by under Government,Podcast

I got to catch up with Paul Kurtz, CEO of TruSTAR Technology and former advisor to the White House on cybersecurity.  Paul and I talk about his work under a President and a President Elect, information sharing and the OPM hack.  This was one of the more interesting interviews I did at Black Hat, at least for me.  Hope you enjoy it too.

Interview with Paul Kurtz, CEO of TruSTAR Technologies

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May 10 2015

Spying pressure mounting worldwide

It’s been an interesting ride ever since Edward Snowden came out with the revelations about NSA spying efforts two years ago.  There was a huge public outcry at first, both from the side who believes spying on your own citizens is necessary and from the side who believes spying on your own citizens is a vital tool in protecting them.  Both sides of the argument have been trying to sway public opinion, with varying degrees of success, but it’s been the spy organizations that have been getting their way as judges and lawmakers side with them for the most part.  But that’s slowly changing and there’s additional pressure mounting on both sides of the argument.  It’s only a matter of time before the pressure seeks an outlet and it may be explosive when it does.

The first problem with spying by intelligence agencies in the US was that it was so secret that most courts couldn’t even get enough information about the practices to determine who had a right to sue for relief from the situation.  You can’t sue the US government unless you can prove you have standing in a case, that you are affected by the action, but you couldn’t prove you were one of the people who were spied upon if the information is too secret to be released even to the court.  So for nearly two years, that venue of combating governmental spying has been stymied.  As of last week though, that’s started to change as the US 2nd Court of Appeals in Manhattan declared that Clause 215 of the Patriot Act did not give authorization for massive collection of phone data.  The ruling also gave the ACLU standing in the case, enabling further legal action, but stopped short of declaring the spying efforts unconstitutional.  In a move that probably didn’t surprise anyone, multiple Senators and Presidential wannabe’s called for new laws to give the NSA and other agencies the power the court just denied them.

Abroad, there’s also a lot of push back against not only American spying, but against the national organizations who are cooperating with American organizations.  Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) had been cooperating with the NSA for years, feeding the American organization information directly from their telecoms and ISP’s, enabling the NSA to track German citizens in ways the BND might not be able to.  This got mostly overlooked when it was revealed that the US was listening in on Angela Merkel’s phone calls, but recent activity and the NSA’s refusal to give justification for the information they’re asking for has caused the BND to stop cooperating with the NSA and is creating quite an uproar in Germany.  Merkel’s political party has been under a lot of pressure because of the information the BND has been providing and there have even been calls for the resignation of the German Interior Minister.

That’s the recent wins on the anti-spying front.  On the other side, advocates of spying continue to push in all sorts of ways, from asking for golden keys in encryption technologies to calls for more power from legislators and less oversight by the judiciary.  Last week’s elections in the UK have emboldened Home Secretary Theresa May to call for the re-introduction of the so-called “Snooper’s Charter” in the country.  GCHQ already has significant powers within the UK and abroad, but the Draft Communications Charter Bill would extend these powers considerably and lessen any oversight on law enforcement agencies.  The good news is that even members of her own party are critical of the bill and might not be willing to back her call for further power.

Proponents of spying powers have nearly religious respect for the governments need for these powers and the government’s restraint of their use.  Theresa May seems to believe that any judicial oversight is too much and that the government can’t be restrained or the terrorists will win.  In the US, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has long held similar beliefs and has been very vocal about it.  Last year he presented to a Fordham University class on law, strongly stating that such powers are needed and cannot be limited.  This year when he went to present, the professor had given his class a new assignment: using only publicly available information, create a dossier on Justice Scalia.  The 15 page document was presented to the Supreme Court Justice and included extensive information about his financial information and family.  Rather than take this as an example of what the NSA or any other organization has at their fingertips and a warning as to why this might be dangerous, Justice Scalia blasted the teacher and his students, questioning their ethics and judgment.  It seems that it’s okay when an impersonal national agency does it, but not when a small group of students research the Justice.

And adding to the pressure cooker of the spying argument, China and Russia have signed an agreement not to hack each other.  It’s probably more accurate to say they’ve agreed not to get caught at it, but this means that their considerable resources will be at least partially turned away from each other and to different projects.  There’s probably not many people who won’t identify the US as the primary target of the freed up hackers, but there are plenty of other places they can put their efforts.  In a lot of ways, it’s like to gangs agreeing not to horn in on each other’s territory while they deal with a third gang.  Add in Russia’s upcoming data localization laws and things get very interesting, very quickly.

“May you live in interesting times.” certainly applies.  There’s pressure from all sides, some wanting to increase spying, some wanting to curb the capability of Western law enforcement agencies.  Both sides have valid points, but it’s a trade-off between the security that such spying might provide versus the damages to civil liberties and personal freedom that it causes.  There’s been almost no proof that spying by international agencies makes us safer, but by the same token it’s hard to express clearly how spying damages the lives of average citizens.  In many ways this is going to be one of the defining issues of the early 21st century and will determine the future of our civilization.  Do we defend our liberties or do we give governments the power to protect us from ourselves?  Only time will tell.

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May 07 2015

RSA 2015 Interview: Mike Walls, Edgewave

Published by under Government,Podcast

I got a chance to talk to Mike Walls, Edgewave‘s Director of Cyber Operations and ex-Navy pilot on the floor of the RSA conference.  I chose Edgewave to talk to specifically because of their marketing material and the number of buzzwords they used to discribe themselves.  Mike does a fair job of defending and refining their meaning as well as highlighting some of the differences he sees between private sector and DoD incident responders.  Still, he uses ‘cyber’ a lot, one of the tells that he really did work in government.

Interview with Mike Walls, Edgewave

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Oct 05 2014

Understanding Apple’s new encryption model

I understand enough about encryption to get myself in trouble, but not much more.  I can talk about it intelligently in most cases, but when we get down to the nitty gritty, bit by bit discussion of how encryption works, I want to have someone who’s really an expert explain it to me.  Which is why I’m glad that Matthew Green sat down to explain Apple’s claims of new encryption that they can’t open for law enforcement in great detail.

The Too Long; Didn’t Read (I often forget what tl;dr means) version of it is that there is a unique ID that’s hidden deep in the hardware encryption chips on your phone that software doesn’t have access to.  This UID is made part of your encryption key through complex algorithms and can’t be pulled out locally or remotely and makes for a strong encryption key that protects your encrypted data.  Do keep in mind that not all of the interesting data on your phone is encrypted, there are still nooks and crannies that can be looked at by someone with physical access to the phone.  And that some of the most interesting stuff on your phone isn’t what’s on it in many cases; it’s the list of who you’ve called, where you’ve been and the like that they can get from the carrier.  That metadata is often at least as important as what’s on your phone, and much easier to get without ever having to even see your phone.

I’m personally very glad that Apple (and Android as well) have begun encrypting phones by default.   Yes, police need to the ability to get into phones and see what people have been doing on them, but the last two years have shown that this ability has been abused for quite some time.  Various governmental officials in the US have decried the move saying they need the ability to catch pedophiles and terrorists.  Yet so far the count of cases where the information needed to catch anyone from either of those categories couldn’t be gotten by other means is still in the single digits.  At the same time the number of  lawsuits against police in the US abusing their ability to get into phones numbers in the hundreds.  Do the math and figure out for yourself if it’s worth law enforcement having easy access.

We’ll be seeing more organizations of all types moving encryption, partially to protect users and partially to defend themselves from the negative publicity being open to the police brings.  There will be a number of missteps, of poor encryption methodology and cases where people realize they can’t just get their backup from the cloud because they used serious encryption and lost the key.  There will be growing pains and there will be examples of guilty people escaping because law enforcement doesn’t have easy access to phone data.  But we need to have strong encryption to protect the privacy of average citizens who’ve done nothing more than catch the attention of the wrong person at the wrong time as well.  Our privacy is much more delicate and deserving of protection than many in power believe it is.

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Aug 21 2014

“I’m proud of my ignorance”

It’s true, we don’t want little things like experience and a broad knowledge of the landscape of technology getting in the way of our policy makers, now do we?  Or at least that seems to be the way US White House cybersecurity coordinator, Michael Daniel thinks.  Why get lost in an understanding of the big picture when you can make decisions based on the information fed to you by consultants and advisers with their own agendas to push?

In a way, I understand what Mr. Daniel’s point is; it’s very important for someone in his position to be able to understand the in and out of policy, perhaps at least as important as understanding the technology.  I wouldn’t want most of the people I see at Defcon or a BSides event making policy decisions; they don’t have the understanding of the long term consequences policy has on the wider world.  But by the same thought process, someone who doesn’t understand the deeper aspects of underlying technologies he’s making decisions about can’t understand the long term consequences of his decisions either.  How can someone make informed decisions if they don’t understand the difference between a hashing algorithm and an encryption technology?

The cybersecurity coordinator role is a management role and most of us have worked with senior managers and C-level execs responsible for security with little or no security experience.  And we know how well that’s worked out.  In rare cases, you find a manager who knows how to listen to people and, perhaps more importantly, knows how to tell the difference between a trustworthy adviser and someone pushing their agenda forward without regard to the outcome.  Those people can be successful as non-technical managers of technical people.  But more often you get non-technical managers who don’t understand the landscape they’re expected to be responsible for, who don’t understand the decisions they’re being asked to make and who are easily led astray by those around them.  And having a non-technical manager with the understanding to communicate with the management team above them is nearly unheard of.

Willful ignorance is never a feature to be lauded or boasted about.  Being proud of your ignorance is a red flag, one that should be a warning to everyone around the individual that they are not currently mature enough for their position.  Better to say, “I’m ignorant, but I’m learning.” to say that you know your limitations but are willing to overcome them than to embrace your limitations and act like they’re really a strength.  Yes, your other experience can help you overcome the areas you’re lacking in, but you have to acknowledge the weakness and work to make yourself better.

As the Vox article points out, we’d never have a Surgeon General who didn’t have decades of experience in medicine, we’d never allow an Attorney General who wasn’t a lawyer and had spent years in a courtroom.  So why are we allowing a person who couldn’t even qualify for to take the CISSP test to advise the leaders of the United States on how to deal with information security issues?  Think about that for a moment: the person who’s advising the White House doesn’t have the experience necessary to apply to for one of the starting rungs on the information security career ladder.  Scary.

Update:  You might also want to listen to the interview with Micheal Daniel and the subsequent defense of his statement about his own ignorance.

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Jul 29 2014

You’ve been reported … by an ad

Published by under Government,Malware,Risk

This looks like an interesting experiment; the City of London police have started placing ads on sites for pirated music warning that the visit to the site has been recorded and reported.  Called “Operation Creative”, this is an effort by the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) to educate people visiting sites that offer pirated music and videos that it’s illegal and could result in prosecution.  As if anyone who visits a pirate site didn’t already know exactly what they were doing and what the potential consequences are.  The City of London police call it education, though intimidation might be a better word for what they’re actually doing.

The folks over at TorrentFreak are concerned with the fact that they couldn’t get the actual banners to show up.  They created a story out of what they could get to, ads for music sites that have reached agreements with the RIAA and music labels.  While this is interesting, I’m more concerned with what the results of this type of ‘education’ will be.

Let’s be honest in saying that anyone who’s using a pirate site has a pretty good idea of what they’re doing.  So the police banners aren’t going to be educational, they’re attempts to make users believe that their IP addresses has been logged for future prosecution.  While they don’t come out directly with the threat, it is implied using the word “reported”.  And who’s to say that the ad network they’re using to supply the ads isn’t using a cookie to gather IP addresses as well as various other information as well.  This definitely sounds more like a threat than most forms of education I’m familiar with.

The problem I have with this PIPCU exercise isn’t the intimidation, but rather the unintended consequences of it.  Scary warnings that the user is doing something illegal aren’t new and in fact have been used by malware authors for a long, long time.  Scareware saying the FBI is going to come knocking at your door for visiting illegal websites is a common tactic, it’s just whether they’re telling you you’ve been to porn sites with underage models or pirate sites to download music that change.  I’m certain the same groups who send these notifications already have fake ads telling users to “pay a fine of $500 or we’re coming to your house”.  If they aren’t in the ad networks, they definitely send out spam to users with the same messages, often using the same exact graphics and messages as official police web sites.  

Rather than discouraging the average pirate site user from visiting the site, this police effort is likely to create the illusion that such scareware ads might be legitimate in the eyes of the user.  In other words, while there might be some impact on the number of people using pirate sites, it’s more likely this will increase the amount of fraud perpetrated against those same users, since it’ll be hard to tell if the warning is really the police or not.  The music companies are probably perfectly happy with this as an outcome, but I doubt the police will enjoy being used as a method for increasing fraud against anyone.

My second concern is less about the fraud and more about the futility of the exercise.  Brian Krebs recently wrote about services that allow an organization to click on banner ads in order to drain the money spent on those ads.  In other words, you pay a service to click on your competitor’s ads without giving them anything of value, using up the money they paid for those ads as quickly as possible, with little or no return.  I see no reason some of the more technically savvy users of pirate site wouldn’t create scripts to do exactly the same to the police.  How hard would it be to use VPN’s or Tor in order disguise IP addresses and hit the same ads again and again?  In theory there are likely to be defenses in place to stop this type of targeted ad attack, but it’s possible to overcome any defense if you have a motivated attacker.

I’m purposefully not addressing the ethics of pirating music, nor am I addressing the efficacy of an outdated business model such as the music industry.  I’ll leave it to someone else to argue both sides of that argument.  What I’m concerned with is the how effective the efforts are going to be and what the consequences of those efforts.  Does the PIPCU expect their ad campaign to have a direct effort on piracy or do they realize this is a futile effort?  Have they thought of the negative consequences their efforts will have with regard to fraud?  Or is this simply an effort to be seen as doing *something* by the recording companies and the public, no matter how negligible the positive outcomes might be?  

I’m not sure what would constitute an effective measure to stop piracy.  For the most part I think the ads we’ve seen in the past, both in movie theaters and online, have been heavy handed and annoyed most of the people they were targeted at rather than dissuade anyone.  This effort doesn’t seem much different, but it has the added disadvantage of making it easier for the authors of scareware to intimidate the public into giving up money for no good reason.  And that’s something that should be avoided whenever possible.

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Jul 17 2014

Root my ride

Published by under Government,Hacking,Risk

If you’ve never watched the anime Ghost in the Shell(GITS) and you’re in security, you’re doing yourself a great disfavor.  If nothing else, watch the Stand Alone Complex series as a primer of what we might expect from Anonymous in the future.  I know my friend Josh Corman tries to sit down to watch it every year or two in order to refresh his memory and help him understand what might be coming down the pipeline from chaotic actors.  And the authors of the manga/anime have a impressive understanding of what the future of hacking might bring in the long term.  Probably a better idea than the FBI does at least.

Earlier this week the Guardian got a copy of an unclassified document the FBI had written up exploring the future of driverless vehicles and the dangers they pose to the future. Their big revelation is that driverless cars could let hackers do things they couldn’t do while driving a normal cars.  In other words, since they wouldn’t have to actually be driving they could hack while the car drove itself.  Which ignores the fact that it’s already pretty easy to get someone else to drive a car for you, presumably much better than a driverless car will be able to do for many years.  If I’m going to commit a crime, I’d rather have someone I can trust at the wheel, rather than take my chances that the police might have a back door (pun intended) into my car’s operating system.

The Guardian story also hints that the FBI is concerned about driverless cars being hacked to be used as weapons.  I have to admit that this is a concern; hacking a target’s car to accelerate at the wrong time or muck with the car’s GPS so that it thinks the road goes straight when it should follow the curve of the cliff wouldn’t be a massive logical stretch.  Also doing the same to use a car to plow into a crowd or run over an individual is a possibility.  However, both of these are things an unskilled operator could do with a real car by cutting the brake lines or driving the car themselves, then running from the scene of the crime.

I think it’ll be much more interesting when driverless cars start becoming common place and young hackers decide they don’t like the feature set and/or controls that are present in the car.  It’s a logical extension to think that the same people who root phones and routers and televisions will eventually figure out how to re-image a car so that it has the software they want, to give the vehicle the capabilities they want.  I know that the Ford Focus has a whole community built around customizing the software in the vehicle, so why will it be any different for driverless cars in the future.

The difference with the driverless car will be that I could strip out many if not all of the safety protocols that will be in place, as well as the limiters on the engine and braking systems.  I want to pull off a robbery and use a driverless car for the get away?  Okay, ignore all stoplights, step on the gas and don’t break for anything.  You’d probably be able to rely on the safety features of other driverless cars to avoid you and you wouldn’t have to worry about the police issuing a kill signal to your car once they’ve read your license plate and other identifying codes.  I’d still rather have an old fashioned car with an actual driver, but at some point those might be hard to get and using one would cause suspicion in and of itself.

On the point of a kill signal, I strongly believe this will be a requirement for driverless cars in the future.  I’m actually surprised a law enforcement kill switch hasn’t already been legislated by the US government, though maybe they’re waiting to see how the public accepts smart phone kill signals first.  Around the same time as the kill switch is being made mandatory, I expect to see laws passed to make rooting your car illegal.  Which, of course, means only criminals will root their cars.  Well, them and the thousands of gear heads who also like to hack the software and won’t know or care about the law.

The FBI hasn’t even scratched the surface of what they should be concerned with about driverless cars.  Back to my initial point about Ghost in the Shell: think about what someone could do if they hacked into the kill switch system that’s going to be required by law.   Want to cause massive chaos?  Shut down every car in Las Angeles or Tokyo.  Make the cars accelerate and shut down the breaks.  Or simply change the maps the car’s GPS is using.  There are a lot of these little chaos producing tricks used through out the GITS series, plus even more that could be adapted easily to the real world.

Many of these things will never happen.  The laws will almost definitely be passed and you’ll have a kill switch in your new driverless car, but there’s little chance we’ll ever see a hack of the system on a massive scale.  On the other hand, given the insecurity we’re just starting to identify in medical devices, the power grid and home networks, I’m not sure that any network that supports driverless cars will be much better secured. Which will make for a very interesting future.

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Jul 09 2014

Civil disobedience against surveillance

Published by under Government,Privacy,Video

Last year I moved to the UK and spend a considerable amount of time in London.  Therefore I’m often on 10, 12, 16 or more cameras at any one time.  I dislike it intensely, but it was something I knew I’d have to be dealing with when I moved.  There’s no evidence that cameras prevent any serious crimes or even less serious ones, and there’s little evidence they’re very useful in catching perpetrators after the fact.  They do, however, cause a lot of innocent people to modify their behaviors slightly since they know they’re on camera.  It’s a subtle societal shift that most people will never even notice.

But one group has noticed and they’re very actively doing something about it.  It’s an anti-surveillance group called Camover that started in Germany and is working its way onto the global scene.  I’d never heard of them before yesterday, when Salon wrote a story highlighting their growth into the US.  I’m of mixed feelings about this group and their growth; part of me wants to work to change society through lawful means, while another part wants to join in on pulling down the cameras and destroying them where ever they intrude on my ever disappearing privacy.  No, I’m not of an anarchist bent at all, am I?

The part that bothers me is that while the members of this group probably see much of what they’re doing as a bit of relatively harmless vandalism, law enforcement probably paints them as felons and terrorists.  Yes, terrorists.  They’ll be painted as destroying the cameras that protect our freedoms and help catch terrorist.  And when they’re caught, they’ll be treated as if they are terrorists, with all the extra-legal, non-judicial treatment that surrounds that designation.  It won’t be a fun adventure for them, that much is sure.

I see a need for anarchists like this to rise up and show us that surveillance can be fought.  I think we need more people to be aware of exactly how our society is being rapidly turned into a state where our every move is watched and judged.  But I don’t think it’s worth risking disappearing into a detention center somewhere, with all of your rights suspended because an agent somewhere decided to label you as a terrorist.

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Jul 06 2014

The dominoes of Internet Balkanization are falling

Published by under Cloud,Government,Hacking,Privacy,Risk

We knew it was coming; it was inevitable.  The events put in motion last June played right into the hands of the people who wanted to cement their control, giving them every excuse to seize the power and claim they were doing it in defense of their people and their nation.  Some might even say it was always destined to happen, it was just a matter of how soon and how completely.  What am I talking about?  The Balkanization of the Internet.  It’s happening now and with Russia entering the competition to see who can control the largest chunk most completely, it’s only a matter of time before others follow the lead and make the same changes within their own country.

Let’s make no mistakes here, there have been countries and governments that have wanted to circumscribe their boundaries in the virtual domain and create an area where they control the content, they control what the people can and can’t see and they have the ability to see everything everyone is looking at as long as the Internet has been in existence.  But prior to the last year, very few countries had either the political impulse or the technical means to filter what came into and out of their countries except China and a few countries in the Middle East.  China had this power because they’d recognized early on the threat the Internet posed to them and the countries in the Middle East have comparatively limited Internet access to begin with, so filtering and controlling their access is a relatively easy exercise.  In both cases though, the efforts have been coarse with plentiful ways to circumvent them, including the use of Tor.  Though it now looks like Tor was itself has long been subverted by the US government to spy as well.

But then Edward Snowden came forth with a huge cache of documents from inside the NSA.  And it turned out all the things that the US had long been shaking its finger at other governments about, things that the US considered to be immoral and foreign to individual freedoms, were the exact things that the NSA had been doing all along.  Sure, it was only foreigners.  Oh, and only ‘people of interest’.  And people with connections to people of interest.  Four or five degrees of connection that is.  And foreign leaders.  And … the list goes on.  Basically, the logical justification was that anyone could be a terrorist, so rather than taking a chance that someone might slip through the cracks, everyone had become a suspect and their traffic on the Internet was to be collected, categorized and collated for future reference, just in case.  Any illusion of moral superiority, or personal freedom from monitoring was blown to shreds. American politicians carefully constructed arguments to assume high ground and tell other countries what they should and should not do torn down and America suddenly became the bad guys of the Internet.  Not that everyone who knew anything about the Internet hadn’t already suspected this had always been going on and the that the US is far from the only country performing this sort of monitoring of the world.  Every government is monitoring their people to one degree or another, the USA and the NSA were simply the ones who got their hands caught in the cookie jar.

The cries to stop data from being sent to the USA have been rising and falling since June and Mr. Snowden’s revelations.  At first they were strident, chaotic and impassioned.  And unreasonable.  But as time went by, people started giving it more thought and many realized that stopping data on the Internet from being exfiltrated to the USA in the Internet’s current form was near unto impossible.  One of the most basic routing protocols of the Web make it nearly impossible to determine ahead of time where a packet is going to go to get to it’s destination; traffic sometimes circumnavigates the globe in order to get to a destination a couple hundred miles away.  That didn’t stop Brazil from demanding that all traffic in their country stay on servers in their country, though they quickly realized that this was an impossible demand.  Governments and corporations across the European Union have been searching for way to ensure that data in Europe stays in Europe, though the European Data Protective Directives have been hard pressed to keep up with the changing situation.

And now Russia has passed a law through both houses of their Parliament that would require companies serving traffic within Russia to stay in Russia and be logged for at least six months by September of 2016.   They’re also putting pressure on Twitter and others to limit and block content concerning actions in the Ukraine, attempting to stop any voice of dissent from being heard inside Russia.  For most companies doing business, this won’t be an easy law to comply with, either from a technical viewpoint or from an ethical one.  The infrastructure needed to retain six months of data in country is no small endeavor; Yandex, a popular search engine in Russia says that it will take more than two years to build the data centers required to fulfill the mandates of the law.  Then there’s the ethical part of the equation: who and how will these logs be accessed by the Russian government?  Will a court order be necessary or will the FSB be able to simply knock at a company’s door and ask for everything.  Given the cost of building an infrastructure within Russian borders (and the people to support it, an additional vulnerability) and the ethical questions of the law, how does this change the equation of doing business in Russia for companies on the Internet?  Is it possible to still do business in Russia, is the business potential too great to pull out now or do companies serve their traffic from outside Russia and hope they don’t get blocked by the Great Firewall of Russia, which is the next obvious step in this evolution?

Where Brazil had to bow to the pressure of international politics and didn’t have the business potential to force Internet companies to allocate servers within it’s borders, Russia does.  The ruling affluent population of Russia has money to burn; many of them make the US ‘1%’ look poor.  There are enough start ups and hungry corporations in Russia who are more than willing to take a chunk of what’s now being served by Twitter, Google, Facebook and all the other American mega-corporations of the Internet.  And if international pressure concerning what’s happening in the Ukraine doesn’t even make Russia blink, there’s nothing that the international community can do about Internet Balkanization.

Once Russia has proven that the Balkanization of the Internet is a possibility and even a logical future for the Internet, it won’t take long for other countries to follow.  Smaller countries will follow quickly, the EU will create laws requiring many of the same features that Russia’s laws do and eventually even the US will require companies within it’s borders to retain information, where they will have easy access it.   The price to companies ‘in the Cloud’ will sky rocket as the Cloud itself has to be instantiated within individual regions and the economy of scale it currently enjoys is brought down by the required fracturing.  And eventually much of the innovation and money created by the great social experiment of the Internet will grind to a halt as only the largest companies have the resources needed to be available on a global scale.

 

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Mar 18 2014

NSP Microcast – RSAC2014 – Utimaco

I spent a few minutes with the CEO of Utimaco, Malte Pollman at RSAC this year.  Malte explains why Hardware Security Modules are important to the web of trust of the Internet, why lawful interception is a not in conflict with that web of trust.  As with all my interviews at RSAC, I asked Malte how the last year’s worth of spying revelations have affected his company and him personally.  Also, I have a problem pronouncing the company name, which for the record is you-tee-make-oh.

NSPMicrocast-RSAC2014-Utimaco

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